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The authors analyze negligence and related matters in the
construction industry. Topics discussed include compensation
immunity, violations of law during the construction process and
the liability of particular parties.
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I. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IMMUNITY
A. Basis of Statutory Immunity
The basic proposition of workmen's compensation immunity
has its genesis in the Workmen's Compensation Law.' In the imme-
* B.S. 1956, Cornell University. Attended Stanford, New York University and University
of Miami Law Schools; L.L.B. 1960, University of Miami. The author is the senior partner
in the firm of Feldman, Abramson, Smith & Magidson, P.A., Miami, Florida; actively prac-
tices trial and appellate law; lectured for the Florida Bar Association in the workmen's
compensation area; and has received recognition for having the constituency of the Florida
Industrial Commission declared invalid. See State ex rel. Carter v. Florida Indus. Comm'n,
28 Fla. Supp. 143 (Leon Cty. Cir. Ct. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Johnston v. State ex rel. Carter,
213 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968), approved, State ex rel Carter v. Wigginton, 221 So. 2d
409 (Fla. 1969). See also Florida Indus. Comm'n v. Neal, 224 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert.
denied, 232 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1969).
B.A. 1971, J.D. 1973, with honors, University of Florida. Member of the Florida Bar
and the Dade County Bar Association. The author is a partner in the firm of Feldman,
Abramson, Smith & Magidson, P.A., Miami, Florida, and specializes in personal injury
litigation and appellate practice.
The authors wish to express their appreciation for the excellent research assistance of
Charles M. Levy, Esquire, Miami, Florida.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.10-11 (1977) provides:
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diate employer-employee relationship, immunity, of course, is pres-
ent if the employer has provided workmen's compensation coverage.
It is the statutory or common employer situation, however, with
which we will be concerned.
It is noteworthy that the word "contractor" as used in section
440.10 of the Florida Statutes (1977) is not synonymous with the
word "contractor" or "general contractor" as used in common parl-
ance, in construction industry jargon, or in other statutes which
440.10 Liability for Compensation.-
(1) Every employer coming within the provisions of this chapter, including
any brought within the chapter by waiver of exclusion or of exemption, shall be
liable for and shall secure the payment to his employees, or any physician or
surgeon providing medical services under the provisions of s.440.13, of the com-
pensation payable under ss.440.13, 440.15, and 440.16. In case a contractor sublets
any part or parts of his contract work to a subcontractor or subcontractors, all of
the employees of such contractor and subcontractor or subcontractors engaged on
such contract work shall be deemed to be employed in one and the same business
or establishment, and the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure the pay-
ment of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcontrac-
tor who has secured such payment. A subcontractor is not liable for the payment
of compensation to the employees of another subcontractor on such contract work
and is not protected by the exclusiveness of liability provisions of s440.11 from
action at law or in admiralty on account of injury of such employee of another
subcontractor.
(2) Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the
injury, except as provided in s.440.09 (3).
440.11 Exclusiveness of Liability.-
(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in s.440.10 shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third party tortfeasor
and to the employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from
such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death, except
that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this
chapter, an injured employee or the legal representative thereof in case death
results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under this chapter or to
maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages on account of such injury
or death. In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury
was caused by negligence of a fellow servant, that the employee assumed the risk
of the employment, or that the injury was due to the contributory negligence or
comparative negligence of the employee.
(2) An employer's workmen's compensation carrier, service agent, or safety
consultant shall not be liable as a third party tortfeasor for assisting the employer
in carrying out the employer's rights and responsibilities under this chapter by
furnishing any safety inspection, safety consultive service, or other safety service
incidental to the workmen's compensation or employer's liability coverage or to
the workmen's compensation or employer's liability servicing contract. The exclu-
sion from liability under this subsection shall not apply in any case in which
injury or death is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical
aggression, or by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, by employees, offi-
cers, or directors of the employer's workmen's compensation carrier, service agent,
or safety consultant.
Id. (emphasis added).
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relate to construction matters. In Hall v. Acme Plasterers, Inc.,I the
Industrial Commission said: "The deputy commissioner can only
look to the workmen's compensation law in order tp ascertain
whether an employer, is in fact, a 'statutory employer.' "
Likewise, in State ex rel. Auchter Co. v. Luckie,' the court
ruled:
It seems clear from the facts in this case that Auchter occupies
the position of primary employer and owner of the land and the
improvements sought to be constructed thereon. The fact that it
is also a licensed general contractor engaged in the construction
industry would appear to be of no importance, and has no con-
trolling effect upon the interpretation to be placed upon the perti-
nent statute under consideration.5
Immunity from a personal injury suit brought by a subcontrac-
tor's employee is not available to the general contractor unless there
exists a primary contractual obligation which the contractor has
sublet or subcontracted to another. Only then can there be a
"contractor" and hence, a party to and from whom immunity en-
ures.
This primary obligation must arise out of a contract.' The Flor-
ida courts have consistently followed the rule originally announced
in Jones v. Florida Power Corp.I It is as follows:
The clear implication in this part of the Act [section 440.101 is
that there must be a contractual obligation on the part of the
contractor, a portion of which he sublets to another. To "sublet"
means to "underlet," Webster's New International Dictionary; in
the context in which it is here used, the effect of subletting is to
pass on to another an obligation under a contract for which the
person so "subletting" is primarily obligated. The Corporation,
under the facts here present, had no primary obligation under a
contract which it was passing on to another. It was not then, a
"contractor" within the meaning of the Act.8
Additionally, the contract must pass a rigid legal test in order
for it to form the basis of immunity. In State ex rel. Auchter Co.,
Auchter Company was the owner of a piece of property. It entered
2. 6 F.C.R. 139, cert. denied, Hall v. Meyers, 200 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1967).
3. Id. at 141.
4. 145 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 148 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1962).
5. Id. at 241.
6. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Brown, 274 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
7. 72 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
8. Id. at 289. See also Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1973); Smith v. Ussery, 261
So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1972).
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into a contractual agreement with Say-A-Stop, Inc., for the con-
struction of a warehouse for Sav-A-Stop. The contract was not only
for construction, but was also for an eventual leasing of the com-
pleted construction by Sav-A-Stop from the Auchter Company.
Auchter, in order to carry out its construction functions, entered
into a contract with Florida Steel Corporation. In the contract, Au-
chter was designated as the "general contractor" and Florida Steel
was designated as the "subcontractor." An employee of Florida
Steel was injured due to the alleged negligence of the Auchter Com-
pany. In that plaintiffs suit against the Auchter Company, the
latter argued it was a general contractor by virtue of its contract of
construction with Sav-A-Stop and its subsequent subcontract with
the plaintiff's employer, Florida Steel Corporation.
In rejecting the defense of immunity, the court stated:
In order for Auchter to be considered a contractor within the
meaning and intent of the statute it would have to be bound by
a contractual obligation to build for some third party the im-
provements which were in the process of construction at the time
[plaintiff] was injured.
Auchter's obligation to construct the building and warehouse
was merely incidental to the primary purpose of the contract.
This is not the type of contractual obligation contemplated by the
statute.
Even if a so-called "general contractor" takes out a policy of
workmen's compensation insurance covering the plaintiff, this
would not afford immunity. Immunity is earned by the obligation
or duty to carry workmen's compensation insurance, and not by
merely providing it. In Jones v. Florida Power Corp., the Supreme
Court of Florida made it very clear that:
The fact that the Corporation in its contracts with Grinnell
and Burns [independent contractors] required them to provide
workmen's compensation for their employees is indeed commend-
able but is irrelevant to a determination of the question here
presented. The question is whether the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act imposed upon the Corporation the duty, as an
"employer" and "contractor," to secure compensation for such
employees. It is the liability to secure compensation which gives
the employer immunity from suit as third party tort-feasor. His
9. 145 So. 2d at 241-42. Accord, Smith v. Ussery, 261 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1972); Cork v.
Gable, 340 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); C & S Crane Serv., Inc. v. Negran, 287 So. 2d 108
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 296 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974).
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immunity from suit is commensurate with his liability for secur-
ing compensation-no more and no less.10
The concept of immunity being commensurate with the duty
to provide compensation might well be the most important aspect
of workmen's compensation immunity. The 1974 amendment to sec-
tion 440.10 of the Florida Statutes is a direct application of this
principle. The amended section provided that "[a] Subcontractor
is not liable for the payment of compensation to the employees of
another subcontractor on such contract work and is not protected
by the exclusiveness of liability provisions of s. 440.11."" The case
law prior to the amendment strained the basic premise that "duty
equals immunity." Thus, the legislature was forced to articulate
this premise in reference to subcontractors vis-a-vis other subcon-
tractors. This amendment has opened a wide vista of potential de-
fendants, even though it fails to have retrospective application.
B. Third Party Practice
A discussion of the Supreme Court of Florida's recent decision
in Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. West Robinson Fruit Co. 13 re-
quires an understanding of sections 440.11 and 768.31 of the Florida
Statutes, 4 and their relationship to each other.
Prior to 1971, section 440.11(1) read as follows:
440.11 Exclusiveness of Liability.-
(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in s. 440.10 shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer
to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, par-
ents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on
account of such injury or death .... 11
In Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan," the Supreme Court
of Florida ruled that this section did not preclude the manufacturer
of a truss roll press from suing plaintiff's employer for indemnity. 7
10. 72 So. 2d at 287. Accord, Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1973); State ex rel.
Auchter Co. v. Luckie, 145 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 148 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1962).
11. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-197, § 6 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.10 (1977)).
12. Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1977).
13. No. 51,650 (Fla., filed March 31, 1978).
14. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.11, 768.31 (1977).
15. 1970 Fla. Laws, ch. 70-25, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1977) (emphasis
added).
16. 235 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1970).
17. The question of contribution was not discussed since the common law rule of no
contribution prevailed until the creation of a statutory right, 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-108, § 1
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977)).
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The court said:
Accordingly, we hold that the Workmen's Compensation Act does
not preclude a passively negligent third party tortfeasor from
being indemnified by an actively negligent employer who has
made payments of compensation and medical benefits to an in-
jured employee, in a suit for damages by such employee against
the third party where it is alleged in the claim for indemnity that
the employer's active negligence was primarily responsible for the
injury.' 8
In an effort to abrogate the effect of Trail Builders, the legisla-
ture amended section 440.11 as follows:
440.11 Exclusiveness of Liability.-
(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in s. 440.10 shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer
to any third party tortfeasor and to the employee. . . and anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law
or in admiralty on account of such injury or death . . .
The amendment to the statute was tested in Sunspan Engi-
neering & Construction Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co." In
Sunspan, the plaintiff sustained injuries when a board fell from a
scaffold he was standing on. The plaintiff then sued Spring-Lock.
The defendant Spring-Lock, had leased the scaffold to plaintiffs
employer, Sunspan; thereafter Spring-Lock sued Sunspan for in-
demnity."1
The Supreme Court of Florida held the statute unconstitutional
since it precluded Spring-Lock's day in court without providing a
reasonable alternative. It was reasoned that:
The employer and employee are authorized by law to sue the
third party tort-feasor for alleged tort but unequally and unreci-
procally the tort-feasor is precluded from suing in turn in a third
party action the employer who may be primarily liable instead
of the tort-feasor for the employee's industrial accident.',
Thereafter the legislature enacted the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act.23 Consistently, the courts interpreting that
Act have held that no right of contribution exists in favor of a third
18. 235 So. 2d at 485.
19. 1971 Fla. Laws, ch. 71-190, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (1977))
(emphasis added). The statute has remained unchanged through 1977.
20. 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975).
21. Although the issue of contribution was raised, the court specifically refused to rule
on it.
22. 310 So. 2d at 7.
23. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-108, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977)).
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party tortfeasor as against the plaintiffs employer. 4 The courts
have reasoned that since the employer and the third party tortfeasor
cannot be under a common liability to the injured plaintiff by virtue
of the immunity provisions of section 440.11, they cannot be "jointly
or severally liable in tort" as the contribution statute requires. 5
The supreme court's decision in Seaboard Coast Line Railroad
v. West Robinson Fruit Co."5 merely reaffirmed that principle and
held section 440.11 constitutional insofar as it grants immunity to
an employer from suit for contribution by a third party tortfeasor.27
The third party tortfeasor in Seaboard admitted active negli-
gence. Accordingly, it was not entitled to indemnity under the tradi-
tional active-passive theories." Instead, it sought to create a remedy
of "implied indemnification" by arguing that, although it may have
been guilty of active negligence, the plaintiffs employer was guilty
of willful and wanton misconduct, and therefore should bear all the
loss. As authority, the third party tortfeasor relied on the equitable
principles endorsed by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
in Stuart v. Hertz Corp.5 That case, however, was subsequently
disapproved by the Supreme Court of Florida °.3  The court in
Seaboard so noted and once again refused to permit indemnity
where the party seeking it was guilty of active negligence, regardless
of how negligent the other party had been.
It should be noted that the court in Seaboard did not even
mention Sunspan, which held section 440.11 unconstitutional inso-
far as it barred a passively negligent tortfeasor from suing a plain-
tiffs employer. 3' How the court could find the statute constitutional
24. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp., 353 So. 2d
137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977); United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 334 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st
Dist.), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1976).
25. This rationale, however, did not stop the court in Shore v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla.
1977), from permitting a tortfeasor's claim for contribution from the plaintiff's partially
negligent spouse. The court's perception of the issue (whether interspousal immunity
"controls over" the contribution act) ignores the proposition that one cannot qualify as a joint
tortfeasor under the Act when he is immune from suit by the plaintiff. Thus, there is a direct
conflict between the interspousal immunity and workmen's compensation immunity situa-
tions.
26. No. 51,650 (Fla., filed March 31, 1978).
27. The Workmen's Compensation Immunity statute is silent as far as contribution or
indemnity is concerned. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977), which specifically precludes contribution,
was perhaps a better subject for constitutional attack.
28. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp., 353 So. 2d
137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
29. 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
30. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977), vacating 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1974).
31. In Seaboard, the court said that an employer "under the clear language of the Florida
Workmen's Compensation Act is not liable to any third party tortfeasor on account of injury
19781 1317
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in Seaboard when only three years earlier it had found it unconstitu-
tional in Sunspan (while the statute remained unchanged in the
interim) was not explained.
II. DEFENDANTS
A. The Owner
One of the most difficult tasks the practitioner will face in
attempting to find a responsible defendant is to locate the "owner"
of the building or property upon which construction has been under-
taken. There are various definitions of "owner" that both the law
and the numerous building codes use. In addition, most large con-
struction projects involve the combination of investment money,
construction and legal expertise. Innovative financing schemes de-
signed to avoid taxation and building code proscriptions, however,
are many times utilized as the basis of denoting who is the "owner"
or "contractor" by the parties to a construction complex. The result
may well be that the principals who "own" the project are the very
same principals who are the "contractors" and have pulled the con-
struction permit.2
It must also be remembered that the "owner" of property has
not only the legal rights and obligations which flow from his status
as such; he has, in addition, rights and obligations flowing from his
status as an employer of independent contractors. When the owner
actively engages in the actual construction, he has the rights and
obligations that flow from that posture as well. It has long been
recognized that the employee of an independent contractor may
maintain an action against the owner of premises for damages suf-
fered as a result of the latter's negligence.3 In State ex rel. Auchter
Co. v. Luckie, the court reasoned that:
Since it has been held that an employee of an owner may main-
tain an action at law against an independent contractor for inju-
ries sustained as a result of the negligence of such independent
contractor, it would follow that an employee of an independent
or death to his employees. The sole and total liability of such employer is that defined in the
Act itself." No. 51,650, slip op. at 191 (Fla., filed March 31, 1978). This language, if read
literally, would likely preclude a claim for indemnity.
32. In the authors' experience, it is not uncommon for the superintendent of construction
to testify that although he was a principal of two closely held corporations, his presence on
the job site was only in a singular capacity-which quite expectedly is the one that will defeat
liability to the plaintiff. We will not herein discuss the doctrine of "two separate heads on
one set of shoulders."
33. Jones v. Florida Power Corp., 72 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954); State ex rel. Aucher Co. v.
Luckie, 145 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 148 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1962).
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contractor may maintain against an owner an action at law for
damages suffered as a result of the latter's negligence'
Defining the phrase "as a result of the latter's negligence" opens the
whole arena of combat.
1. EMPLOYER OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
It has often been stated as a general rule that an employer of
an independent contractor is not liable for the latter's negligence.
This rule, however, has so many exceptions that it is probably now
itself the exception rather than the rule.35
The employer of an independent contractor will be held liable
as the result of a breach of his duty. When there is a duty owed to
an injured worker, one may proceed to determine whether there has
been a breach thereof. It should be recognized at the outset that the
acts and omissions giving rise to liability may be those of the con-
tractor, the employer of the contractor, and also those of third par-
ties. The clearest example of liability is for those acts which are the
direct acts of the party sought to be charged-unequivocal misfeas-
ance. The most difficult areas encompass the gamut of omissions to
act-nonfeasance. These can embrace situations where the em-
ployer of an independent contractor fails to act while the indepen-
dent contractor negligently performs his work.3
Where the "owner" or the employer of an independent contrac-
tor participates directly in the work activity, duty and liability are
most easily found. The Supreme Court of Florida, in Conklin v.
Cohen, 37 explained that an owner may be held liable "if he has been
actively participating in the construction to the extent that he di-
rectly influences the manner in which the work is performed." 8 The
holding in Conklin was intended to encompass an owner-
participation type of case since the supreme court reversed the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's predication of non-liability on the basis of
the owner's active participation in the construction; that is, action
in concert with the general contractor. The Conklin court stated
that to impose liability, one or more identifiable acts of negligence
34. 145 So. 2d at 242.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 409 (1965); 17 FLA. Jua. Independent Contractors
§ 5 (1958).
36. It would be helpful to have easy access to a definition which clearly explains the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance; it would also be useful to have ready
guidelines to know when misfeasance and nonfeasance create and do not create liability. Life,
like the law, however, does not always offer clear-cut choices.
37. 287 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1973).
38. Id. at 60.
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must be demonstrated-"acts either negligently creating or negli-
gently approving the dangerous condition resulting in the injury or
death to the employee . ...
The holding in Conklin is consistent with the rule stated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 414, which is an alternative
avenue of liability predicated on the nonfeasance of an employer. 0
It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that, although the Conklin
court was dealing with a situation of alleged misfeasance, the deci-
sion should not be read as precluding liability for nonfeasance.
2. NON-DELEGABLE DUTY: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, SECTION
416
The employer of an independent contractor will ordinarily not
be vicariously liable to an injured workman solely because of the
acts or omissions of the independent contractor. He may, however,
be directly liable for those very same acts if they constitute a breach
of his non-delegable duty.4
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price,' the supreme court held
that the doctrine of non-delegable duty was the law in Florida. This
case dealt with the inherently dangerous activities rule as promul-
gated in Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 416. The Supreme
Court of Florida stated: "It may well be that said doctrines
[dangerous instrumentality and inherently dangerous work] apply
without exception to third party members of the public . . . .
The court then stated that the doctrine of vicarious liability for non-
delegable duty did not extend to employees of independent contrac-
tors who sue the employer of the independent contractor, absent a
39. Id.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965) provides:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control
of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose
safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by
his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
41. The authors acknowledge the very difficult problem of trying to separate issues of
vicarious liability from those of direct liability when dealing with the nondelegable concep-
tualization. The cases uniformly show the same inconsistency and lack of distinction between
duty and the breach thereof, as do the misfeasance and nonfeasance cases. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note § 415 (1965); Emelwon v. United States, 391 F.2d 9
(5th Cir. 1968); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1964). What is really
happening is that the law views the relationship of the owner-employer and the independent
contractor and then determines that a duty remains with the owner-employer. It is submitted
that there is one basic underlying rationale behind both types of nondelegable duty-the
determination that certain types of undertakings are so important that one may not insulate
himself from the consequences thereof.
42. 170 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1964).
43. Id. at 298.
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showing of negligence on the part of the employer engaging in a
hazardous occupation, who has contracted with the independent
contractor to carry out inherently dangerous work." The employer
of the independent contractor, however, does himself have a duty
to the employees of the independent contractor where the work is
inherently or intrinsically dangerous.
It would appear that the general non-delegable duty owed by
the employer of the independent contractor is one of due care. In
Mai Kai, Inc. v. Colucci,1" the supreme court set forth the general
parameters.
Those cases stating exceptions to this doctrine do not, in any
instance brought to our attention, involve latent defects or condi-
tions which, as in the present situation, could not have been
discovered by reasonable care, whatever conduct that standard
may require in a particular case. The duty to exercise that
reasonable care is nondelegable in the sense that a contract for
its performance by another will not necessarily eliminate an
owner's responsibility. The duty, however, remains one of due
care or reasonable care in preventing or correcting an unsafe con-
dition, as opposed to absolute liability for a contractor's negli-
gence."6
It should be noted that Colucci did not deal with dangerous work
or with an employee of an independent contractor.
3. BUILDING CODES: GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS
The principle of non-delegable duty finds special application-
where the duty is imposed by a statute, ordinance or administrative
regulation. 7 The rule is well articulated in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, section 424 (1965).
One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a
duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety
of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection
the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor
employed by him to provide such safeguards.
This principle of law has often led to the imposition of liability on
owners of property where contractors fail to observe the provisions
44. Id. One might well feel that for some unexplained reason employees are given the
status of last-place citizens.
45. 205 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1967) (dictum).
46. Id. at 293.
47. Bialkowicz v. Pan American Condominium No. 3, Inc., 215 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1968) (duty imposed by city building permit nondelegable to a subcontractor).
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of building codes." Some discerning minds might view this as vicari-
ous liability in a situation where vicarious liability should exist.
4. INITIAL PRECAUTIONS
Clear nonfeasance can create liability where the employer of an
independent contractor should provide for precautions to avoid un-
reasonable risk of physical harm to others.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 413 (1965) sets
forth this rule:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which
the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its prog-
ress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others un-
less special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if
the employer (a) fails to provide in the contract that the contrac-
tor shall take such precautions, or (b) fails to exercise reasonable
care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such pre-
cautions.
5. KNOWLEDGE OF CONTINUING CONDITION
Finally, where one gains knowledge of a dangerous situation
created by his independent contractor, he may incur liability
through his failure either to halt the operation or to correct it."
B. The Architect or Engineer
An architect has been defined as one who plans or designs for
the erection, enlargement or alteration of buildings and who fur-
nishes supervision over the construction thereof.5" An architect may
incur liability if his plans or designs are negligently prepared and
someone is injured as a result.5 Although he does not warrant his
design services, an architect or engineer must exercise the same
degrees of care and skill as would other architects or engineers
within the community.52 However, where a statute, ordinance or
48. See, e.g., Mastrandrea v. J. Mann, Inc., 128 So 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
49. Maule Indus., Inc. v. Messana, 62 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1953); Peairs v. Florida Publishing
Co., 132 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
50. Verich v. Florida State Bd. of Architecture, 239 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See
FLA. STAT. § 467.09(1)(a) (1977).
Although the word "architect" is used in the text, the same principles apply to engineers
as well.
51. LeMay v. U.S.H. Properties, Inc., 338 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976) (architects);
Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Assocs., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1964) (engineers).
52. Audane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Assocs, 168 So. 2d 333, 335
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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administrative regulation requires a minimum standard of design,
that standard must be followed.53 It is no defense that industry
standards are lower than those established by law.54
An architect may also be liable when he fails to exercise reason-
able care in connection with his supervisory activities. In Geer v.
Bennett55 a concrete mason, engaged in pouring a floor slab, fell
from the second floor while walking along a wooden form. There
were no guardrails along the edge of the building as required by
regulations of the Florida Industrial Commission. In holding that
an action would lie against the architect, the court observed that the
architect: (1) was required to make daily visits to the site to check
the progress of construction; (2) was required to assure that the work
was progressing in accordance with plans and specifications; and (3)
as the owner's agent, was required to maintain direct supervision
over the contractors. The court stated the architect's duty as fol-
lows:
They are under a duty to exercise such reasonable care, technical
skill and ability, and diligence as are ordinarily required of archi-
tects in the course of their plans, inspections and supervisions
during construction for the protection of any person who foresee-
ably and with reasonable certainty might be injured by their
failure to do so."
The Supreme Court of Florida sought to further clarify the
architect's responsibilities during construction in Conklin v. Cohen"
and in A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham.9 In Conklin, the Supreme Court
of Florida, citing Geer, reversed the District Court of Appeal, Third
District's dismissal of a complaint 0 charging the architect with: (1)
failure to advise the owner concerning job safety; (2) failure to pro-
vide for safety inspections; and (3) failure to discover and correct a
hazardous condition (lack of guardrails), when a reasonable inspec-
tion would have revealed it.' In A.R. Moyer, Inc., the supreme court
expanded the architect's liability to general contractors who suffer
damage due to the architect's failure to diligently carry out his
supervisory functions. The court carefully distinguished tort liabil-
53. Henry v. Britt, 220 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
54. Id. at 920.
55. 237 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
56. Id. at 314.
57. Id. at 316. See also Lee County v. Southern Water Contractors, Inc., 298 So. 2d 518
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
58. 287 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1973).
59. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
60. 262 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
61. Id. at 718.
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ity from contractual liability and suggested that although construc-
tion workers may indeed be third party beneficiaries of the owner-
architect agreement, a distinct tort action may be instituted against
the architect without regard to privity. Two different avenues are
therefore open to the injured worker.
A discussion of liability based exclusively on owner-architect
agreements requires a detailed examination of the standard docu-
ments of the American Institute of Architects' (A.I.A.). Most perti-
nent are the "Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and
Architect" and the "General and Supplementary Conditions of the
Contract for Construction."
These documents historically gave the architect considerable
authority over the work progress, thus providing plaintiffs with con-
siderable ammunition against him. The documents authorized ar-
chitects to stop work, "[w]henever, in his reasonable opinion, he
considers it necessary or advisable to insure the proper implementa-
tion of the Contract Documents." 2 Such power led many courts to
rule that the architect's contractual right to stop the work carried
with it the corresponding duty to stop the work in the face of a
hazardous condition.63
Believing that these decisions held the architects liable as a
result of a contractual duty, the A.I.A. revised the standard forms
by disclaiming any responsibility for construction site accidents.
Specifically, the word "supervision" was no longer used, and the
provision giving the architect the power to stop the work was
stricken. The 1974 editions, moreover, disclaim any responsibility
to the worker even if the architect hires a full time project represent-
ative whose sole responsibility is to work at the project site. 4
If, in fact, the scope of the architect's duty is defined by the
contract, as the A.I.A. contends, is the architect absolutely liable
or negligent as a matter of law for his failure to abide by all contrac-
tual provisions? Stated differently, if the architect agrees to super-
vise, but fails to do so, should he not be automatically liable on the
basis that the contract is the sole consideration defining his duty?
The answer should be yes if the A.I.A.'s position is accepted. It is
questionable, however, whether in fact the architect's duty is de-
fined solely by the contract, thus allowing him to contractually limit
62. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, DOCUMENT A 201, GENERAL AND SUPPLEMENTARY
CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION 5 (11th ed. 1967).
63. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher
& Assocs., 19 Utah 2d 101, 426 P.2d 621 (1967).
64. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER
AND ARCHITECT § 1.2 (14th ed. 1974).
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his liability. The cause of action is generally brought not in con-
tract, but in tort, where courts look upon exculpatory clauses with
great disfavor. Thus, although admittedly the contract documents
are important factors to consider in determining whether the archi-
tect exercised due care under the circumstances, it is not at all
determinative of the scope of the architect's duty. "7 "Various fac-
tors, . . . such as the capacity of the parties to bear the loss, the
foreseeability of the particular injury, the relationship between the
parties, the policy of preventing future injuries, and moral turpitude
attached to the act are often considered.""
As seen in A.R. Moyer, Inc. and Conklin, and more recently in
LeMay v. U.S.H. Properties, Inc.," Florida courts, in defining duty,
do not generally place much emphasis on the architect's contract in
a suit by an injured third party. A more appropriate test is whether
the alleged duties "fall within the duties ordinarily assumed or
placed upon an architect by custom and practice of the business
community.""
Furthermore, regardless of the specific terms of the contract,
any of the following considerations may result in liability being
imposed: (1) When the architect in fact exercised control over the
job;7 (2) when the architect signed the application for a building
permit (if he did, he may have assumed the duty to comply with
all applicable building and safety codes); (3) when the architect
filed documentation with state administrative agencies or other
agencies having jurisdiction over the project (if he did, he may have
assumed certain duties related to building and safety codes); .(4)
when the architect, as "owner's agent" on the job, failed to safe-
guard the owner's interest by not insuring that all building and
safety codes were complied with; or (5) when the architect was
required by statute, ordinance or regulation to enforce compliance
with applicable building and safety codes. 2
65. See Comment, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 535 (1969).
66. See A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973); Foster v. Herbison
Constr. Co., 263 Minn. 63, 115 N.W.2d 915 (1962); Larson v. Heintz Constr. Co., 219 Ore.
25, 345 P.2d 835 (1959).
67. A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973); Foster v. Herbison Constr.
Co., 263 Minn. 63, 115 N.W.2d 915 (1962); Larson v. Heintz Constr. Co., 219 Ore. 25, 345
P.2d 835 (1959).
68. Comment, supra note 65, at 542.
69. 338 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
70. MacIntyre v. Green's Pool Serv., Inc., 347 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977). See
Graulich v. Frederic H. Berlowe & Assocs, Inc., 338 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
72. See, e.g., SOUTH FLA. BUILDING CODE § 305.3 (1976).
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C. Co-employees
It is unnecessary for a subcontractor's employee to sue the em-
ployee of another subcontractor since the 1974 amendment to sec-
tion 440.10 of the Florida Statutes73 made it possible to sue a sub-
contractor directly for the negligence of his employees.74 Presuma-
bly, however, a subcontractor is still immune from suit by an em-
ployee of the general contractor.75 The pre-amendment cases prohib-
ited such a suit,7" nor does the amendment affect the immunity of
the worker's direct employer. Thus, a worker may sometimes be left
with no other choice but to sue a fellow employee. The first Florida
case to specifically recognize that an employee could be sued for his
negligence in injuring a fellow employee was Frantz v. McBee Co.77
The court reasoned that since there is no obligation on the part of
an employee to secure workmen's compensation for a co-employee,
he is subject to suit as a third party tortfeasor. s
More recently, in West v. Jessop" a worker sued the president
of her company for negligence in rendering treatment for a head-
ache. While the court warned that a corporate officer could not be
sued individually as a co-employee for a breach of the corporate
employer's duty to provide a safe place to work, there are circum-
stances under which he may incur liability: "there is no reason why
a stockholding corporate officer should come under the umbrella of
exclusive protection when he negligently injures another employee
through an affirmative act. In these circumstances, he should be
held personally responsible for his actions in the same manner as
any other employee.""0
D. Suppliers and Materialmen
Suppliers of equipment or materials who are not actually en-
gaged in the construction process have always been subject to suit.',
73. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-197, § 6 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.10 (1977)).
74. This was not permitted prior to the amendment. See Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v.
Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1977).
75. See FLA. STAT. §§ 440.10, .11 (1977).
76. Aderhold v. Blair Contracting Co., 350 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977); Kolarik v.
Rodgers Bros. Serv., Inc., 268 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972); Smith v. Poston Equip. Rentals,
Inc., 105 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
77. 77 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1955).
78. Id. at 800.
79. 339 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
80. Id. at 1137 (emphasis added). See also Cromer v. Thomas, 124 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1960). For a detailed discussion of this area from another jurisdiction, see Adams v.
Fidelity and Cas. Co., 107 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1959).
81. Hunt v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc., 216 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1968); Goldstein v. Acme
Concrete Corp., 103 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1958); Street v. Safway Steel Scaffold Co., 148 So. 2d
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The courts, however, have consistently had difficulty determining
whether the defendant was a materialman or a contractor. If the
court found the latter, then the defendant was immune from suit.
In light of the 1974 amendment to section 440.10,2 the defendants
designation is no longer relevant, except where the plaintiff is em-
ployed by a general contractor. If the plaintiff is employed by a
general contractor, that plaintiff must still demonstrate that the
defendant is a materialman or supplier, and not a subcontractor.
The test generally used by the courts is one of the relative value of
labor and material.8 3
Suppliers of scaffolds and shoring equipment are among the
most notorious defendants in this area.84 Likewise, suppliers of con-
crete blocks, bricks, cement, boxes and similar materials may gener-
ally be sued, particularly where they provide little or no labor at the
project site."
E. The Workmen's Compensation Carrier
In Florida, part of every premium dollar collected by a work-
men's compensation insurance carrier is earmarked for job safety.
Sometimes with this in mind" and sometimes with apparent igno-
rance 7 the courts have woven a Protective veil for the workmen's
compensation insurance carrier. The decisions have rested on im-
munity or the lack of duty. This does not mean, however, that there
are no duties owed or that there is always immunity. Although the
legislature amended Florida Statutes section 440.118 prior to the
cases cited herein," all these decisions construed the section as it
existed at the time of the accident, which was prior to the amend-
ment. The section, as amended, reads in part:
38 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
82. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-197, § 6 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.10 (1977)).
83. Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1958).
84. Montesano v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 213 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Sunspan
Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975); Street v. Safway
Steel Scaffold Co., 148 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962); Mason v. Waco Scaffold & Shoring
Co., 33 Fla. Supp. 150 (Brevard Cty. Ct. 1970); Di Muro v. Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold
Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 784, 14 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1961); Hyde v. Russell & Russell, Inc., 176 Cal.
App. 2d 578, 1 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1959).
85. See Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1958); Cork v. Gable,
340 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
86. Mann v. Highland Ins. Co., 461 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1972); Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.
2d 56 (Fla. 1973).
87. Allen v. Employers Serv. Corp., 243 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
88. 1970 Fla. Laws, ch. 70-25, § 1; 1971 Fla. Laws, ch. 71-190, § 1 (current version at
FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1977)).
89. See Mann v. Highland Ins. Co., 461 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1972); Conklin v. Cohen, 287
So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1973); Allen v. Employers Serv. Corp., 243 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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An employer's workmen's compensation carrier, service agent, or
safety consultant shall not be liable as a third party tort-feasor
for assisting the employer in carrying out the employer's rights
and responsibilities under this chapter by furnishing any safety
inspection, safety consultive service, or other safety service inci-
dental to the workmen's compensation or employers' liability
coverage or to the workmen's compensation or employer's liabil-
ity servicing contract. The exclusion from liability under this
subsection shall not apply in any case in which injury or death is
proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical ag-
gression, or by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, by
employees, officers, or directors of the employer's workmen's
compensation carrier, service agent, or safety consultant."
The emphasized words suggest that there appears to be no immun-
ity for those who accept money and then do nothing. Similarly,
there appears to be no immunity from third party beneficiary suits.
It seems unlikely, however, that the courts will permit any suit
except to the extent specifically provided in the statute.
III. VIOLATIONS OF LAW
No field of human endeavor is subject to more statutes, ordi-
nances, regulations and administrative decisions than is the con-
struction industry. It is doubtful whether a building can go up with-
out at least some violations of law occurring during construction.
These violations often lead to liability.
The largest source of state administrative regulations affecting
the construction industry is the Florida Department of Commerce.'
It has the authority "to investigate and prescribe what safety de-
vices, safeguards or other means of protection shall be adopted for
the prevention of accidents in every employment or place of employ-
ment. 9 On the local level, numerous ordinances and building codes
govern not only the manner in which a building must be con-
structed, but also what shall be done to avoid accidents.
Historically, the violation of laws designed to protect construc-
tion workers has been deemed at least prima facie evidence of negli-
gence . 3 In the wake of deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad,4
however, it now appears that the violation of regulations protecting
90. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(2) (1977)(emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Id. § 440.56.
92. Id. § 440.56(2)(a).
93. Scott v. Midyette-Moor, Inc., 221 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969); Alford v. Meyer,
201 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967); Mastrandrea v. J. Mann, Inc., 128 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1961).
94. 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
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construction workers is negligence per se. In deJesus, the Supreme
Court of Florida said: "[Niegligence per se is [also] a violation of
any other statute which establishes a duty to take precautions to
protect a particular class of persons from a particular injury or type
of injury."95 Clearly, these regulations establish standards designed
"to protect a particular class of persons [workers] from a particular
injury or type of injury."" The question which inevitably arises,
however, is whether the pertinent statute, ordinances or regulation
applies to the particular defendant. Stated differently, what is the
scope of the regulation? While building codes generally apply to
"owners" and, under the Florida Department of Commerce regula-
tions, to "every employer," in practice these regulations have much
broader application. 7
One of the governing principles of law is that a person with
control over the activities of another is responsible for the latter's
negligent activities if the activities fall within the scope of the for-
mer's power to control. This proposition has been well articulated
by the American Law Institute:
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage
in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor
knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use
the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner
as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others."
This principle is consistent with numerous California cases constru-
ing regulations similar to those in Florida."
An analogy to the construction industry can be drawn from
Tamiami Gun Shop v.. Klein, 100 where the Supreme Court of Florida
established the rule of strict liability for the violation of a statute.
The court held the seller of a firearm liable for all injuries occurring
as a result of his illegal sale of the firearm to a minor. The defendant
charged with strict liability was a person who would have been
criminally liable under the express language of a criminal statute.
It is difficult to conceive that a wholesaler or other person who
supplied a gun to a retailer, knowing it would be sold to a minor,
would be held to any lesser standard of liability than the person
95. Id. at 201 (dictum).
96. Concord Fla., Inc. v. Lewin, 341 So. 2d 242, 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
97. Cf. Scott v. Midyette-Moor, Inc., 221 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) (building safety
regulations applicable to tenants).
98. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965).
99. E.g., Di Muro v. Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co., 193 Cal. App. 784, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 551 (1961); Hyde v. Russell & Russell, Inc., 176 Cal. App. 578, 1 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1959).
100. 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959).
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directly responsible for compliance with the literal terms of a crimi-
nal statute. The language employed by the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, in Tamiami Gun Shop supports this contention:
"The responsibility rests on all to see that the spirit and letter of
the law is observed and kept."'"'
On the federal level, however, while the applicability of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970102 is of current interest,
its value remains substantially unsettled. The two crucial questions
are: first, whether OSHA creates a cause of action; and second, to
whom OSHA is applicable.
The judiciary, considering the first question, has generally con-
cluded that OSHA does not create a new private cause of action."3
OSHA only creates a duty in the penal, not the civil sense.104 Al-
though OSHA does not create a legal civil duty, it may set a stan-
dard of care for an already existing duty, and a breach of that
standard should constitute negligence.
The most hotly contested and unsettled issue presented by
OSHA is whether the person against whom the plaintiff seeks to
apply OSHA as a standard can be someone other than his direct
employer. This issue has been raised in connection with 29 U.S.C.
654 (1970) which requires "employers" to furnish their "employees"
with a safe place to work.' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has considered whether OSHA regulations were
violated by a general contractor although only a subcontractor's
employees were endangered by the hazard.' The Second Circuit
held that a direct employer-employee relationship was not neces-
sary to impose the penalties proscribed by OSHA. In reaching its
101. 109 So. 2d 189, 191 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. discharged, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959)(em-
phasis added).
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
103. Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975).
104. Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 483
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970) provides:
(a) Each employer-
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are caus-
ing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employ-
ees;
(2) shall comply with occuational safety and health standards pro-
mulgated under this chapter.
(b) Each employee shall comply with occupational safety and health standards
and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this chapter which are
applicable to his own actions and conduct.
106. Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'r, 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1975).
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decision, the court interpreted subsection 654(a)(2) as setting a
standard of care above and beyond the seemingly limited provision
of subsection 654(a)(1). In so holding, the Second Circuit reasoned
that the policy of the Act is to protect all workers. In this regard,
the court recognized that a construction site is peculiar in that it
has many "employers" and "employees," working side by side, and
thus requiring the application of OSHA to all employers. 07
The question of OSHA's applicability to the employer-
employee relationship, however, is far from being a settled area of
law. In Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 0 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted the OSHA Commission
decision that, under the Act, a general contractor is not jointly
responsible with a subcontractor for the safety of the subcontrac-
tor's employees. Again, it is important to note that, as in the Second
Circuit's decision, the Fourth Circuit dealt with the imposition of
penalties as prescribed by OSHA. Whether the reasoning and hold-
ings will be extended to impose civil duties remains undecided. No
valid reason exists, however, for treating OSHA regulations differ-
ently than state regulations. Both are often identical in language
and purpose: adoption of reasonable standards which will promote
safety within the construction industry.0 9
107. See also Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Constr. Co., 331 So. 2d 651 (1976);
Dunn v. Brimer, 259 Ark. 885, 537 S.W.2d 164 (1976).
108. 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974).
109. It should be recognized that there has been some discussion of OSHA in admiralty
cases considering the Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring. See Brown v. Mitsubi-
shi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1977); Arthur v. Flota Mercante Gran Centro
Americana S.A., 487 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973). In examining these maritime cases it is of the
utmost importance to recognize that the application of OSHA is directly and peculiarly
affected by the policy considerations behind the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. These policy considerations pertain to the peculiar
status of the ship owner and render these cases inapplicable to the construction site situation.
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